Neither the ordinary notions of pleasure, wealth, and honor nor the philosophical theory of forms provide an adequate account of this ultimate goal, since even individuals who acquire the material goods or achieve intellectual knowledge may not be happy. According to Aristotle, things of any variety have a characteristic function that they are properly used to perform. The good for human beings, then, must essentially involve the entire proper function of human life as a whole, and this must be an activity of the soul that expresses genuine virtue or excellence.
Ethics I 7 Thus, human beings should aim at a life in full conformity with their rational natures; for this, the satisfaction of desires and the acquisition of material goods are less important than the achievement of virtue. A happy person will exhibit a personality appropriately balanced between reasons and desires, with moderation characterizing all.
Ethics is not merely a theoretical study for Aristotle. Unlike any intellectual capacity, virtues of character are dispositions to act in certain ways in response to similar situations, the habits of behaving in a certain way.
Thus, good conduct arises from habits that in turn can only be acquired by repeated action and correction, making ethics an intensely practical discipline. According to Aristotle, the virtuous habit of action is always an intermediate state between the opposed vices of excess and deficiency: too much and too little are always wrong; the right kind of action always lies in the mean. Ethics II 6 Thus, for example:. Notice that the application of this theory of virtue requires a great deal of flexibility: friendliness is closer to its excess than to its deficiency, while few human beings are naturally inclined to undervalue pleasure, so it is not unusual to overlook or ignore one of the extremes in each of these instances and simply to regard the virtue as the opposite of the other vice.
Not bad advice, surely. Some version of this general approach dominated Western culture for many centuries. Because ethics is a practical rather than a theoretical science, Aristotle also gave careful consideration to the aspects of human nature involved in acting and accepting moral responsibility. Moral evaluation of an action presupposes the attribution of responsibility to a human agent.
But in certain circumstances, this attribution would not be appropriate. Ethics III 1. First, actions that are produced by some external force or, perhaps, under an extreme duress from outside the agent are taken involuntarily, and the agent is not responsible for them. Thus, if someone grabs my arm and uses it to strike a third person, I cannot reasonably be blamed or praised morally for what my arm has done.
Second, actions performed out of ignorance are also involuntary. Thus, if I swing my arm for exercise and strike the third party who unbeknownst to me is standing nearby, then again I cannot be held responsible for having struck that person. Notice that the sort of ignorance Aristotle is willing to regard as exculpatory is always of lack of awareness of relevant particulars. Striking other people while claiming to be ignorant of the moral rule under which it is wrong to do so would not provide any excuse on his view.
During the deliberative process, individual actions are evaluated in light of the good, and the best among them is then chosen for implementation. The Nature of Virtue i. Dispositions ii. Choice iii. Evaluation iv. Virtuous Actions and Happiness v. Doctrine of the Mean vi. Relative to Us vii. Knowledge viii.
Motivation ix. Reliableness II. The List of Virtues i. Courage and Continence ii. Temperance and Incontinence iii. Benevolence iv. Social Virtues v. Magnificence and Greatness of Soul vi. Justice III. Virtuous Action i. Virtuous Acts ii. Right Acts iii. Reciprocity of Virtue IV.
Acquiring Virtue i. Habituation ii. She also defends Aristotle against misgivings about the virtues of character by showing these to be based on uncharitable readings, or on straightforward misinterpretations.
She argues against the idea that virtues of character amount to moderation Kant , and the suggestion that they are remedies for natural deficiencies in human nature Philippa Foot, Christine Korsgaard. Moreover, it is through the doctrine of the mean that the contribution of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom is best appreciated, for it takes a reasoned view of the situation to hit the mean.
The doctrine of the mean also provides a criterion for distinguishing between real virtues and mere emotions or natural temperament. These include the nature of moral dilemmas, virtuous motivation, how to understand the so-called practical syllogism, what the virtuous agent needs to know, and what kind of political arrangement best nurtures the development of virtuous persons.
So in less than pages, Gottlieb takes on an array of difficult, and much disputed, issues in the Nicomachen Ethics. It is a bold enterprise she undertakes.
She intends the study not only for Aristotle scholars, but aims at a broader audience interested in ethical theory, particularly virtue ethics. The purpose is to show that on a sound reading of Aristotle, his account of the virtues of character makes an important contribution to the contemporary ethical debate. At its best, scholarship manages both things in a single study.
The comparisons would have required a more thorough treatment to be fruitful. Perhaps the scope of difficult issues is too wide to be manageable. By and large, however, it is a fairly conventional interpretation she puts forward.
The phenomenon to be articulated is that some people tend to have a good judgement, and to get it right even in demanding, complex situations. Indeed, explaining what the virtues of character are, and in what way they help the agent hit the mean, by appealing to how the virtuous person would react has an air of circularity.
My concern here is not the vexed question of the place of contemplation in the happy life. For even the picture of practical wisdom remains incomplete. Far from being merely instrumental, the exercises of intellectual virtues, practical wisdom included, are just as ethically significant in their own right as the virtues of character, being part and parcel of the happy human life.
So when Gottlieb claims in chapter 7 that virtuous actions can be chosen for their own sake, and not merely for the sake of happiness, one wonders what notion of happiness she is operating with. Since they are constituents of the happy life, there is no difference between choosing virtuous actions for their own sake and choosing them for the sake of happiness.
It is true that virtuous action is motivated both by the non-rational part of the soul and by the reason-possessing part.
I now turn to some more specific issues. In chapter 5, Gottlieb discusses the claim that the virtues of character form a unity such that one cannot be had without all the rest. For instance, in order to exhibit the virtue of generosity, it is not enough to give the right amount to the right person at the right time for the right reasons. The resources shared must also have been acquired in accordance with other virtues such as justice. So the fully virtuous person must integrate the different virtues into a whole.
Equipped with this disposition, the agent can assess the particular situation against the demands of the different virtues so as to form a balanced decision what to do. In addition to the role played by practical wisdom in deliberating to such decisions, Gottlieb pinpoints its role in the genetic process of turning the natural temperaments into fully blown prohairetic virtues, i.
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